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ABSTRACT

1.

Two recent computational models of legal argumentation,
by Verheij and Gordon respectively, have interpreted critical questions as premises of arguments that can be defeated
using Pollock’s concepts of undercutters and rebuttals. Using the scheme for arguments from expert opinion as an example, this paper evaluates and compares these two models
of critical questions from the perspective of argumentation
theory and competing legal theories about proof standards
for defeating presumptions. The applicable proof standard
is found to be a legal issue subject to argument. Verheij’s
model is shown to have problems because the proof standards it applies to different kinds of premises are “hardwired” into the system. Gordon’s model overcomes these
problems by allowing different proof standards to be assigned to each issue and by supporting arguments about
proof standards within the same framework. These differences are minor however compared to the insight gained
from these models jointly about the theory of argument
schemes and critical questions. They show how schemes can
be used to implement tools for constructing arguments, and
not just for classifying arguments ex post facto, and help
clarify how critical questions confound declarative knowledge about conditions for using argument schemes with procedural knowledge about how to evaluate and criticize arguments made using these schemes.

Argument schemes are “forms of argument” for “stereotypical patterns of human reasoning” [1]. They can be viewed
as inference rules for presumptive reasoning. Argument
schemes have been used primarily to classify, ex post facto,
arguments in natural language texts. For this purpose, the
schemes are used as patterns to support the reconstruction
of the form of an argument during the interpretation of
the text. This is in stark contrast to the usual function
of inference rules, as tools for deriving new conclusions from
premises.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4.2 [[Information System Applications]: Types
of Systems—decision support; J.1 [Computer Applications]: Administrative Data Processing—law
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, work in AI and Law has begun to implement models of argument schemes which does justice to the inference
rule conception of argument schemes, by modeling them in
such a way that they can be used as tools to find, construct
or generate arguments. The earliest work of this kind models particular schemes for legal argument, such as various
schemes for arguments from evidence [6]. In this paper we
want to take a closer look at two recent AI and Law models,
by Verheij [8] and Gordon [2], which both try to model argument schemes in a more general way. Of particular interest
to us here is the way they both model some kinds of critical
questions as additional premises which can be presumed to
be acceptable or not under certain conditions and defeated
using various kinds of defeasible arguments.
Our goal in this paper is to present these two computational
models of argument and evaluate them from the perspective
of the philosophy of argumentation and a legal analysis of
the concept of presumptions.
We begin in the next section by presenting an example argument, using the scheme of argument from expert opinion,
to help us to illustrate various points more concretely. Section 3 presents the critical questions for arguments from
expert opinion. Section 4 introduces the idea of representing some critical questions as implicit premises. Section 5
is a brief summary of the current legal discourse about the
proof required to defeat presumptions. Section 6 and Section 7 present Verheij’s and Gordon’s computational models
of argument, respectively. Section 8 completes the paper by
evaluating and comparing these models in light of the insights from the philosophy of argumentation and the legal
debate about the proof required to defeat presumptions presented earlier. This closing section also uses these two models, conversely, to reflect on the theory of critical questions.

2.

ARGUMENT FROM EXPERT OPINION

Let’s take the following argument as an example; it represents a common kind of evidence that might be brought
forward in a trial:

The medical examiner (ME) said that the tissue sample found at the crime scene matches the
DNA of the suspect. Therefore, the tissue sample found at the crime scene matches the DNA
of the suspect.

3.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

Given that the example argument can be so identified and
analyzed as an instance of the scheme of argument from
expert opinion, the next problem is how to evaluate its
strength. The basic method proposed in [11, p. 223] makes
use of critical questions associated with each argument
scheme. Six such critical questions have been identified for
arguments from expert opinion:
1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert
source?
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the domain S?

This argument looks like it is persuasive on the grounds
that the ME is an expert in the domain of DNA testing.
Thus one way to analyze this argument is to use the scheme
for the argument from expert opinion. This scheme (often
also called appeal to expert opinion in logic textbooks) was
formulated in [11, p. 201] as follows.

Argument from Expert Opinion
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain
S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in domain
S) is true (false).
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).

To apply this scheme to the argument above, we need to
interpret the argument to identify the expert, E, the subject domain, S, and the proposition, A. This is not a simple
matching process, as the sentences in the argument do not
have the same form as the premises in the argument scheme.
For example, the subject domain is not explicitly mentioned
in the text of the argument. The text can be interpreted in
various ways, as referring to the domain of medicine, forensic medicine, medicine as applied to forensic evidence, or
something of the sort. Only once the argument has been
interpreted so as to find values for all the variables in the
scheme, can the scheme be used to categorize it as an argument from expert opinion.
Legal arguments are not always the same as everyday conversational arguments. If this were an everyday conversational argument not being used in a legal setting, we could
just go ahead and assume that it fits the scheme above, and
base our analysis and evaluation on this assumption without
getting into too much trouble. But law is evolving its own
standards for analyzing and evaluating arguments based on
expert opinion. First there was the Frye1 standard, and now
with the advent of Daubert2 and newer cases, other standards have not only been proposed, but also backed by legal
precedents on how a court must introduce and handle expert
opinion evidence. Bypassing all these legal considerations at
this point, we go on to examine hypothetically how the example argument could be evaluated using current methods
of argumentation for conversational arguments.
1
2

Frye v. United States (293 F. 1013 D.C. Cir. 1923)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (509 U.S. 579)

3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as
a source?
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other
experts assert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on
evidence?
Critical questions, as applied to everyday conversational arguments, are devices that can be used to pinpoint potential
weaknesses in a given argument. They can be applied when
a user is confronted with the problem of replying to that argument, or making some assessment of what the argument is
worth and whether to accept it. Here, the expertise question
challenges the premise that the witness, E, has expert knowledge in some domain, or practical mastery of a well-defined
or codified skill. Credibility is the notion that because E is
an expert in a domain of knowledge, E is in a position to
know, and therefore what E says has more value as evidence
that what a non-expert would say. The field question challenges the premise that the domain of expertise of E is the
relevant domain, S. The opinion question calls into doubt
whether the witness literally testified that A is the case, instead of some other statement that may or may not imply
A. The trustworthiness question challenges the honesty and
objectivity of E as a source of knowledge. The consistency
question challenges the correctness of the expert’s testimony
with contradictory statements by other acknowledged experts. Finally, the backup evidence question challenges the
expert to support his claim with evidence.
In the case of the example argument, one natural critical
question to begin with would be to ask about the ME’s
qualifications. Is she a medical doctor? Is she a specialist?
How much experience does she have with forensic evidence
cases? Of course, in law such an argument could be the
subject of much more detailed analysis and evaluation. The
ME might be cross-examined in a trial, for example, and
asked specific questions. Other experts might be brought
in. In some of the more difficult cases, there might be a
battle of experts, and critical question 5 could be fought
out.

4.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS AS IMPLICIT
PREMISES

The common way of diagramming arguments, as presented
by Walton in [10], does not explicitly provide a way to include critical questions in the diagrams. Chris Reed, one of
the developers of the Araucaria [7] computer program for
argument diagramming, posed the question, in the spring of
2001, whether critical questions can be understood as implicit premises of an argument which can be made explicit
and visualized in diagrams as additional premises. Examining this question in the context of the scheme for argument
from expert opinion, it appears that most of the six critical
questions indeed can be seen as implicit premises, with the
exception of questions 4 and 5. Let’s first take a look at the
critical questions which can be viewed as implicit premises:
1. When you put forward an appeal to expert opinion,
you assume, as part of the argument, that the source
is credible, or has knowledge in some field.
2. You assume that the expert is an expert in the field of
the claim made.
3. You assume that the expert said something, made
some pronouncement, from which the claim can be extracted by inference, or in some cases, even by direct
quoting.
6. You assume that the expert’s assertion was based on
some evidence within the field of his or her expertise.
The argument doesn’t make much sense, or hold up as a
plausible appeal, without these assumptions being part of
it. Questions 4 (trustworthiness) and 5 (consistency) are
different however. One does not assume the witness is untrustworthy or that his testimony is inconsistent with the
testimony of other expert witnesses. To challenge the trustworthiness of a witness, evidence of bias or dishonesty must
be produced. Similarly, to challenge the consistency of the
expert’s testimony, contradictory testimony of other experts
in the same field say must be produced as evidence. The
criticism needs to be backed up by telling us what these
other experts have said and showing how these statements
conflict with what our expert said. The difference between
these two kind of critical questions may be one of burden of
proof. You could say that critical questions 4 and 5 have a
positive burden of proof attached, whereas the other critical questions do damage just by being asked. Appropriate
answers must be provided for critical questions of this latter
type or the argument from expert opinion will fail.

5.

LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS

Our discussion about whether critical questions can be
viewed as implicit premises suggests there may be two types
of critical questions, depending on whether or not the condition implied by a question can be presumed to be answered
affirmatively. To shed further light on this issue, perhaps
it would be helpful if we first take a brief look at how presumptions have been analyzed by legal theorists.
A presumption is a device used in law to move argumentation in a tribunal ahead by provisionally accepting a proposition even though there is insufficient evidence to prove it

or disprove it. A presumption can be accepted as long as
the evidence is insufficient to disprove it. An example is the
legal presumption of death used in cases of wills and settlement of estates. If a person has disappeared with no trace,
after a designated number of years, he can be presumed to
be dead for purposes of settling the estate. In such a case,
it can’t be proved by sufficient evidence that the person is
dead. No body may have been found. But still, it can be
presumed legally that he is dead. It is an important property of presumptions that they are defeasible. Acceptance
is provisional, and if new evidence comes into a case, the
presumption that was once accepted may now have to be
given up.
Although presumptions are commonly used in law, and
seem fundamental to legal argumentation, how presumptions should be evaluated for acceptance or rejection by logical standards is an unsettled problem. There are two different theories of presumption that have been offered in law.
They differ mainly on the question of how much evidence
is sufficient to refute a presumption. What this difference
amounts to can be seen by considering the Letter Example
from Chapter 4, ‘Burdens and Presumptions’, of [3, p. 107]:
The respondent suffered a fall on a dark stairway in an apartment building. He sued the proponent, the building’s owner, claiming that she
did not keep the stairway in a safe condition,
because the lighting did not work properly. To
prove notice, the proponent claimed she mailed
a letter to the respondent, informing him that
several of the lights in the stairway no longer
worked.
According to [3, p. 103], there is a defeasible rule of law that
creates a presumption that the letter was received, subject
to exceptions. The presumption states that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and deposited in an appropriate
receptacle is presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of the mail. Unless the presumption created
by this rule is defeated, the properly addressed, stamped,
and deposited letter will be deemed to have been received
in what is considered to be the ordinary amount of time
needed in that delivery area. How the presumption works
in such a case is fairly clear. The defeasible rule sets up a
presumption in much the same way as the rule above about
the presumption of death did.
The first of the two theories about how much evidence is
required to defeat a presumption is the Thayer-Wigmore
bursting bubble theory [3]. According to this theory, a presumption is defeated by the introduction of any evidence
that counts against it. This theory holds presumptions to
be weak, comparing them to “bats flitting in the twilight,
but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts” [3, p. 109].
Suppose the party claims that he always checks his mail
every day and that he is sure he did not receive the letter. According to the bursting bubble theory, that would
be enough evidence to enable a jury to decide to defeat the
presumption of receipt of the letter.[3, p. 110].
According to the second theory, the Morgan-McCormick

theory, once a presumption has been accepted, the burden
of disproving it shifts to the opponent [3, pp. 111–112]. On
this theory, “the respondent must prove it more likely than
not he had not received the letter or suffer a finding that he
did” [3, p. 112].

for argument from expert opinion explicitly includes both
of these conditions. The third critical question asks what E
asserted that implies A, although the minor premise of the
scheme appears to require E to have directly asserted A, not
some other statement.

Thus the two theories differ on how strongly presumptions
hold. The Morgan-McCormick theory considers the bursting
bubble theory as giving too slight and evanescent a holding
power to them [3, p. 111]. The bursting bubble theory allows even a small amount evidence against the presumption,
once it turns up, to be sufficient to defeat the presumption.
The Morgan-McCormick theory seems to demand a higher
quantity of evidence. It requires that the presumption to
remain accepted until sufficient evidence to disprove it has
come in. In the Morgan-McCormick theory, there is a shift
in the burden of proof. Once the presumption has been
put forward by one side in a dialogue, and both parties accept it, the other side then has to disprove it before it is
defeated. The Morgan-McCormick theory could therefore
be called the shifting burden of proof theory. Which theory
is more accurate as an account of how legal presumptions
should be evaluated is an unsettled issue. It could be that
one theory is right and the other is wrong. Or it could be
that there are different kinds of presumptions with varying
strengths in different cases, and hence different standards
for evaluating what quantity of evidence should be required
to defeat a presumption.

When it comes to formalizing schemes, Verheij’s proposal
for reducing redundancy makes sense. Part of the formalization required is a general condition that an argument fitting a scheme can, and indeed always should, be evaluated
by asking whether the premises are in fact true in the given
case.

6.

VERHEIJ’S APPROACH

Recently, there have been two proposals from the field of Artificial Intelligence and Law for modeling argument schemes,
including critical questions, one by Verheij [8] and the other
by Gordon [2]. Taking the above considerations from argumentation and legal theory into account, we discuss both of
them in this paper, beginning with Verheij’s work in this
section.
Verheij distinguished four different roles of critical questions
in argument [8, Section 5]:

1. criticizing a schemes’ premises,
2. pointing to exceptional situations in which the scheme
should not used,

Verheij’s way of modeling the other roles of critical questions draws upon Pollock’s distinction between two kinds
of defeat relations between arguments, called undercutters
and rebuttals [4]. Drawing this distinction in legal cases has
proved tricky, but what it amounts to can be quickly explained as follows. A rebuttal is an argument if favor of a
conclusion which is the negation (opposite) of the original
conclusion. An undercutter, on the other hand, attacks the
inference that was used in the original argument to derive
the conclusion from the premises. The undercutter may,
for example, cite an exception to the rule used in the first
argument.
Verheij has developed a logic for defeasible reasoning, called
DefLog, which is capable of representing both undercutters
and rebutters. There is not room to present DefLog in detail
here, but it should suffice for our purposes to point out that
it defines a language for representing statements, including
defeasible rules, and a (nonmontonic) inference relation between sets of these sentences. Since rules are statements in
this logic, they can be used both as premises and conclusions in other rules. The logic includes a unary operator on
sentences for dialectical negation.
Argument schemes are modeled as defeasible rules in
DefLog. The various roles of critical questions are all modeled using such rules in Verheij’s approach. Critical questions of the first, which merely restate premises of a scheme,
can be safely ignored, as discussed previously. Critical questions of the second, which point to exceptional situations,
are modeled as undercutting rules of the following form,
negating the applicability of other rules, using the operator for dialectical negation:

3. setting conditions for a scheme’s use, and
4. pointing to other possible arguments relevant to a
scheme’s conclusion.

Concerning the first role, Verheij argued that there should
be no need for explicit critical questions that merely ask
whether a premise of a scheme is true or not, since “a precondition of the use of any [his emphasis] scheme is that
its premises are true, well supported, justified, ...” [8, section 5]. If you look again at the six critical questions for
the scheme for argument from expert opinion above, the
first three arguably can be considered redundant in this way.
The first two critical questions ask whether the witness is an
expert and, if so, whether the statement asserted is within
his domain of expertise. The major premise of the scheme

exception-1 ->
x(premise-1 & ... & premise-n -> conclusion)
As illustrated here, we are using in this paper, as a concrete
syntax for DefLog rules, -> as the operator for the defeasible
conditional, x as the unary operator for dialectical negation
and & as a conjunction operator.
Since the premises of rules in DefLog are presumed not to
hold, such exceptions will not undercut the rule unless they
are supported by further statements.
Critical questions of the third kind, setting conditions on the
applicability of a scheme, are modeled in Verheij’s approach
as DefLog rules of the following form:

condition-1 ->
(premise-1 & ... & premise-n -> conclusion)
An important point to make is that these conditions are
ordinary premises and are thus presumed not to hold,
just like other premises. They must be either explicitly assumed, by adding the condition to the theory of the case, or
derivable from other statements. The above rule is logically
equivalent in DefLog to the following version:
condition-1 & premise-1 & ... & premise-n ->
conclusion
Finally, critical questions of the fourth kind, pointing to
other arguments relevant to a scheme’s conclusion, are modeled simply as additional rules having the same conclusion
or, for rebuttals, the opposite conclusion, using the operator for dialectical negation. That is, given a rule for
conclusion-1, rebuttals would be modeled using rules of
this form:
premise-1 & ... & premise-n -> x(conclusion-1)
Verheij has also developed a method and computer software
for diagramming arguments, called ArguMed [9], which is
compatible with DefLog. In Verheij’s diagramming method,
arguments which undercut other arguments are drawn using a device known as entanglement: the given argument is
represented on the diagram in the usual way as an arrow
(representing a linked or convergent pattern) joining a set
of premises to a conclusion; the undercutter is represented
as another arrow pointing to the original arrow.

7.

GORDON’S APPROACH

In a recent paper [2], Gordon presented a computational
model of defeasible argument, including Walton’s concept
of argument schemes, for use in legal reasoning support systems. Building on ontologies from the Semantic Web, the
model is intended to provide an integrating framework enabling diverse models of a variety of legal argumentation
schemes, such as arguments from legislation, precedent cases
and evidence, to be used together in a comprehensive system supporting argument construction, selection and evaluation, as well as the justification of legal decisions. Argument schemes in this model are interpreted as interactive,
heuristic search procedures, to be used to help find and construct arguments during legal discourse.
There is room here only to provide a brief sketch or overview
of Gordon’s model of argumentation. Please see his recent
paper [2] for further details. Gordon’s computational model
is not a theorem prover for a formal logic. Rather, it defines structures for representing various elements of argumentation, including atomic propositions, arguments, cases,
issues, argument schemes and proof standards, and defines
functions for properties of these elements, in particular the
presumptive validity of arguments and the acceptability of
atomic propositions. That is, the model is high level, functional specification of a computer program which can be
implemented in any programming language.

Inspired by the work Verheij discussed in the previous section of this paper [9], three of the four different roles of critical questions are modeled in Gordon’s system using different
kinds of premises, called antecedents, presumptions and exceptions. (The fourth role of critical questions is handled
not by premises, but with additional arguments pro or contra the conclusion of the first argument.) The antecedents
of an argument are not presumed to be acceptable, but must
be supported by further arguments in order to have a chance
of being evaluated as acceptable. Presumptions are superficially similar to Verheij’s conditions, except that they are
deemed acceptable unless called into question. Gordon’s
model of argument includes an explicit construct for issues.
A proposition is called into question, or put at issue, by
adding an appropriate issue to the model of the case, using
a speech act provided by some argumentation protocol. Finally, exceptions are similar to exceptions in Verheij’s model,
premises which are not assumed acceptable but which can
block or undercut the argument if put at issue and supported
by further argument.
The data type for arguments is defined as follows:
type argument =
{ id: id,
direction: {pro, con},
consequent: atom,
antecedent: atom list,
presumptions: atom list,
exceptions: atom list }
Here is an example record, illustrating how this type of data
structure can be used to represent an argument from expert
opinion:
id: arg-1
direction: pro,
scheme: argument-from-expert-opinion,
consequent: (mentally-ill defendant true),
antecedents:
(isa e expert-testimony)
(domain e d)
(assertion e (mentally-ill defendant true))
(within d (mentally-ill defendant true)),
presumptions:
(credible e true)
(based-on-evidence e true),
exceptions:
(trustworthy e false)
(consistent-with-other-experts e false)
Arguments are evaluated to determine the acceptability of
propositions, considering all the arguments which have been
made thus far in the discourse and applicable proof standards. Each issue of a case is assigned a proof standard.
Which proof standard is applicable to an issue may be an
legal issue in its own right, requiring further argumentation
to clarify.
Arguments are evaluated using abduction. The presumptions of arguments which have not been put at issue, called

assumptions, play the role of hypotheses. A context a subset
of these assumptions. A supporting context, C, of a proposition at issue, p, is a minimal context which, together with
the accepted propositions of the case, called facts, and a
set of conditional propositions derived from the arguments,
called justifications, entails p. Classical propositional entailment, which is monotonic, is used. Defeasible reasoning is
achieved not by using a nonmonotonic logic, but by using
abduction with classical logic. An extension is a maximally
consistent set of propositions. Proof standards are defined
using extensions. For example, the ‘scintilla of evidence’
proof standard is defined so that a proposition meets this
standard iff it is a member of at least one extension. And
the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is defined so that
a proposition meets this standard iff it is a member of every
extension.
Again, presumptions and exceptions are handled differently
in this model of argument evaluation. Presumptions, so long
as they are not at issue, may be assumed. Exceptions may
not be assumed, but require, like ordinary antecendents,
support from further arguments. Accepting an exception
does not rebut the conclusion of the argument, but rather
acts as a kind of undercutting defeater cancelling the support of the argument for its conclusion. See [2] for the technical details of how this is achieved. The basic idea is to
introduce applicability assumptions to the justifications generated from arguments. A justification is generated for each
exception to express the constraint that the applicability
assumption and the exception cannot both be consistently
accepted in the same context.

8.

DISCUSSION

Although Verheij and Gordon both model critical questions
using premises of defeasible arguments, as we have seen there
are numerous significant differences between the two systems:
• Whereas Verheij models arguments, including their
critical questions, as a set of statements in a formal
logic for defeasible reasoning, Gordon models them as
data structures in a functional specification of a computer program;
• Specific argument schemes can be represented using
Verheij’s system, as defeasible rules in DefLog. Gordon’s system is not intended for representing or implementing specific schemes, but rather as a way of
integrating diverse components for supporting legal
reasoning, where each such component may implement one or more argument schemes. In term’s of
Prakken’s layered model of dialectical systems [5], Gordon’s model is an argumentation framework for recording and evaluating arguments and Verheij’s model is
an example of the logic layer for representing knowledge and generating arguments. It should be possible
to use Verheij’s system as one component for generating arguments for Gordon’s system, together with
components for other legal argument schemes, such as
arguments from precedents using case-based reasoning.
• Most relevant for the purposes of this paper, although

both systems model critical questions as premises, arguably only Gordon’s system provides a way to model
the standard of proof which should be associated with
these premises in a legally adequate way.
This last difference requires further discussion. Recall
that there are competing legal theories about the appropriate proof standard for defeating legal presumptions, the
Thayer-Wigmore bursting bubble theory and the MorganMcCormick theory. Verheij’s approach implements the
bursting bubble theory for critical questions which play the
role of exceptions. The slightest argument supporting the
exception can suffice to undercut the prior argument. Moreover, Verheij’s approach to modeling critical questions which
set conditions on the schemes use does not allow these conditions to be presumed at all. Rather, just like ordinary
premises, they must first be supported with further arguments. That is, Verheij’s system may allow an exception
to be accepted with too little proof and requires too much
proof of a condition.
Gordon’s system handles exceptions and conditions (called
presumptions) in a more uniform way. All presumptions
which are not at issue are deemed acceptable and all exceptions which are not at issue are deemed not acceptable.
In both case, these defaults hold only so long as they are
not at issue. Once a party has made an issue out of an
exception or presumption, their acceptability depends on
the applicable proof standard. Proof standards for both the
Thayer-Wigmore and the Morgan-McCormick theories can
be modeled. Which theory is applicable is a legal issue which
can be addressed in the context of arguing particular cases.
Gordon’s model allows the issue of which proof standard
to apply to be handled, within the same case model, along
with arguments about other issues, but it must be admitted
that the model does not currently automatically assign proof
standards chosen as a result of such discussions to issues in
the model.
These differences between the two approaches are minor
compared to their joint contribution to the understanding
and analysis of argument schemes. They both illustrate that
schemes can be understood not only as patterns for classifying, ex post facto, arguments appearing in natural language
texts, but also as tools for finding, constructing or generating arguments, to help people to argue effectively. Argument
schemes are like cookie cutters. But they have been used up
until now mainly to squeeze the baked cookies back into the
cutters to classify them as stars, moons, hearts and so on. In
Verheij’s and Gordon’s work, the cutters are used to make
cookies.
And they both help to make clear that the original conception of critical questions confounds declarative knowledge
about conditions for using schemes and exceptions blocking the use of schemes with procedural advice about how
to evaluate or criticize arguments. This confounding of two
kinds of knowledge in the concept of critical questions is
the reason why the premises of argument schemes were reiterated, apparently redundantly, in the critical questions: to
remind the user to question the acceptability of the premises
when evaluating the argument. The models of Verheij and
Gordon, typical for Artificial Intelligence research, cleanly

separates declarative and procedural knowledge. Thus, just
as the work in AI and Law has been inspired and informed
by the philosophy of argumentation, the precision of computational models such as these has proven useful for helping
to advance this field of philosophy.
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